ABSTRACT. After three years from the ECtHR’s judgements of Viola v. Italy, where the Court found the Italian life imprisonment under section 4-bis of the Prison Administrative Act in violation with Article 3 ECHR, Law 199/2022 finally reformed the legislative framework of ‘ergastolo ostativo’. However, the legislator seems to not have correctly implemented the principles enshrined in the Convention. Indeed, the present work is aimed at assessing to which extent the new Italian ‘ergastolo ostativo’, as reformed by Law 199/2022, is compatible with Article 3 ECHR. Because of the lack of doctrine on the issue, the research is primarily based on a critical analysis of the new provisions, in light of the relevant ECtHR’s case law. It will be shown how the current formulation of Article 4-bis can raise no few challenges to the ECHR. The present work, indeed, after a detailed analysis of the main ECtHR’s jurisprudence on life imprisonment, highlights the need of rethinking the new framework of ‘ergastolo ostativo’ in line with such principles.

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* PhD Candidate at University of Macerata in Global Studies, Institutions, Rights and Democracy – IUS/21; LL.M. Graduate in Global Criminal Law at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.
1. Introduction

Until October 2022, Article 4-bis (*ergastolo ostativo*) of the Prison Administrative Act¹ (hereinafter O.P.) provided that the prisoners convicted for particularly serious crimes, such as mafia offences and terrorism, could only be granted special prison benefits upon request if they cooperated with the judicial system. In other words, should a convicted prisoner for one of the offences listed in Article 4-bis O.P. had not cooperated with judicial authorities,² he or she would not have been eligible for parole or other beneficial treatments, such as the possibility to obtain temporary release, alternative measures to detention, or to work outside the prison.

In the case *Viola v. Italy (n. 2)*³ the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) highly criticized the approach of Article 4-bis O.P., as formulated before the enactment of reform in 2022.⁴ More specifically, the ECtHR considered that the absolute presumption set forth by the provision prevented the competent court from reviewing the application for conditional release and whether the applicant had made progress towards rehabilitation that the detention could no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. The Court ultimately found the violation of Article 3 European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) claiming that *ergastolo ostativo*, as provided by the law in force at that time, drastically limited both the prospect of release of the prisoner and the possibility of a review.

On October 2022, three years after the ECtHR’s judgement *Viola v. Italy*, the Italian Government, with Law Decree D.L. 162/2022, converted into law L. 199/2022, reformed the legislative framework of the *ergastolo ostativo*. Nevertheless, the Law poses no few problems with regard to the compatibility of the new formulation of *ergastolo*.

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¹ Law July 26, 1975 n. 354 (Norme sull’Ordinamento Penitenziario e sull’esecuzione delle misure privative e limitative della libertà).
² According Article 58-ter O.P. to effectively cooperate with law enforcement and judicial authorities means to make efforts to prevent the criminal activity from being carried to further consequences or concretely assist the police or judicial authority in gathering decisive elements for the reconstruction of the facts and for the identification or capture of the perpetrators of the crimes.
³ Marcello Viola v Italy (n° 2) App no 14612/19 (ECtHR, 13 June 2019).
⁴ Law December 30, 2022 n. 199.
ostativo with the principles enshrined in the ECHR.

Indeed, the present work, after a short analysis of Article 3 ECHR, will retrace the main ECtHR’s case law on life imprisonment (section 2). Subsequently, a detailed study of the new legislative system of *ergastolo ostativo* will be given (section 3), focusing the attention on the analysis of the possible challenges of *ergastolo ostativo* to the ECHR, with the aim to find whether the new legislative framework results in degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR and whether the review of the sentence is *de facto* irreducible. Finally, the last section (section 4) will provide some recommendations to the Italian legislator on how the amended framework could potentially be reformed in light to the ECHR principles.

2. **Article 3 ECHR: principles on life imprisonment**

Article 3 ECHR is considered to be one of the core rights of the Convention and ‘one of the fundamental values of democratic societies’,5 Together with Article 2, the right to life represents one of the most important pillars within the context of human rights. In fact, under no circumstance is a derogation possible (*jus cogens*),6 not even in case of public danger,7 regardless of the nature of the offence committed.8

Although very clear in its formulation, Article 3 gave rise to a proliferation of case law by the ECtHR,9 aimed at assessing whether life imprisonment10 is in violation of the

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5 Saadi v Italy, App no 37201/06, para 127 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008).
6 Article 15(2) ECHR.
7 Ireland v the United Kingdom, App no 5310/71, para 1631(ECtHR, 8 January 1978): ‘(…) there can be no derogation therefrom even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (…)’.
8 Indelicato c Italie, App no 31143/96 (ECtHR, 18 October 2001), para 30; ‘(…) La nature de l’infraction qui était reprochée au requérant est donc dépourvue de pertinence pour l’examen sous l’angle de l’article 3’.
10 Life imprisonment has been defined as a form of punishment pursuant to which a prisoner, as a result of a criminal conviction, is detained for his entire life See Dirk van Zyl Smit and Catherine Appleton, *Life Imprisonment: A Global Human Rights Analysis* (Harvard University Press, 2019) 35.
Convention. On the one hand, the Convention does not expressly prohibit the imposition of life sentences on Contracting States. However, on the other hand, it is self-evident that such a form of punishment poses not few concerns with regard to human rights. Particularly, the judgments rendered by the ECtHR concern claims alleging both degrading treatment and an incompatibility with the human dignity of whole-life sentences.

In accordance with Article 3, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. In particular, torture was defined by the European Commission on Human Rights in the Greek Case as ‘an inhuman treatment which has a purpose such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment’.\textsuperscript{11} Inhumane are all treatments that cause not only physical but also mental unjustifiable severe suffering. Of course, not all ill treatments can be labeled as inhumane treatments. As the Court stated in \textit{Gäfgen v. Germany}, ‘in order for an ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3, it must attain a minimum level of severity’\textsuperscript{12} meaning that it requires a sufficient degree of suffering or infliction of pain. Such minimum level of severity is assessed, as the Court recalled, having regard to the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of such treatment, and the mental and/or physical effect produced.\textsuperscript{13} To assess whether an ill-treatment can be classified as torture two conditions have to be met: 1) there must be a severe treatment, causing a very serious and cruel suffering; 2) such severe pain must be inflicted with the aim of obtaining information, inflicting punishment, or intimidating.\textsuperscript{14}

Whereas, a degrading treatment can be classified as a punishment or other treatment aimed at degrading or ‘grossly’ humiliating a person in front of another individual, including treatments that compel the victim to act against his will.\textsuperscript{15} As it can be inferred, it is very difficult to draw a line between degrading treatment and

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Gäfgen v Germany} App no 22978/05 (ECtHR,1 June 2010) para 88.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Jalloh v Germany} App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 17 July 2006) para 67.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Gäfgen} (n 12) para 63.
treatments that fall outside the scope of the Convention. This difficulty is mainly due
to the crucial role that the subjective element of torture – namely how the victim
perceives the treatment –, plays in the definition of the offence.16

As above mentioned, the challenges to Article 3 ECHR arise specifically with
regard to the claim of inhumane and degrading treatment of whole-life sentences.
Because of the extremely intrusive nature of such punishment, the ECtHR elaborated
a set of criteria that have to be fulfilled in order for a life sentence to fall under the scope
of Article 3 ECHR. Indeed, in the next sections, the main principles of life
imprisonment elaborated by the ECtHR will be examined, through an accurate analysis
of the main Court’s jurisprudence.

2.1. The compatibility of life imprisonment with the ECHR

As a preliminary notion, the Court has always stressed that only States are
competent to design penal policies and to establish the conditions for the sentences’
review mechanisms. Nevertheless, the Court constantly reminded that such policies
must be implemented in light of the principles of the Convention.

As well described by the Chamber in the Vinter case,17 there are three different
types of life sentence: 1) a life sentence that provides the eligibility of release after having
served a part of it; 2) a life sentence required by the law that does not contain any
 provision concerning the possibility for parole which requires a judicial decision in order
to be imposed; 3) a life sentence without the possibility of parole imposed by a judge
who has no discretion as to whether impose it or not.18 The Chamber, as reported by
the Court in Vinter, found that no issue arise with regard to the first type of sentence.
The most problematic types of whole-life sentences are undoubtedly the second and
the third. Indeed, the focus of the ECtHR’s judgments that will be analyzed in the
following lines primarily concerns these two types of life sentences.

In the first place, as previously mentioned, and as recalled several times by the

17 *Vinter Et Autres c Royaume-Uni* App no 66069/09 130/10 3896/10 (ECtHR, 9 July 2013).
18 ibid para 84.
ECtHR, the imposition of a life sentence on adults is not *per se* contrary to the scope of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court found that, because a life sentence without parole may raise issues with regard to the compatibility with Article 3, minimum guarantees have to be met when imposing such a form of punishment.

2.1.1. The prospect of release and the possibility of a review: the *de facto* and *de jure* reducibility of whole life sentences

According to the Court, in order for a life sentence to be compatible with Article 3 ECHR, there must be a prospect of release and a possibility of a review. This means that, when evaluating the compatibility of life imprisonment to Article 3, the attention must be focused on finding whether there is any hope for the prisoner to be released. And such a requirement is met when the sentence is *de jure* and *de facto* reducible. With the wording ‘*de jure*’ the Court intended to say that in domestic systems must exist a norm that expressly provides for an effective mechanism of review of the sentence. Whereas ‘*de facto*’ has been interpreted as meaning that the prisoner must not be deprived of a concrete prospect of release. In other words, ‘the prospect of release must exist in concrete terms’, namely there must be a ‘genuine possibility of release’. Nevertheless, as highlighted by the Court in *Kafkaris*, the Convention does not grant persons serving life sentences the right to early release, nor the right to the termination or remission of the sentence through an administrative or judicial review.

Indeed, as it can be observed, the concept of reducibility of a life sentence appears to be strictly related to the concept of (early) release, which is itself subordinate

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19 *Kafkaris v Cyprus* App n 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) para 97 and references cited therein.
20 See generally, *Nivette v France* App no 44190/98 (ECtHR, 3 July 2001); *Einhorn v France* App no 71555/01 (ECtHR, 16 October 2001); *Stanford v the United Kingdom* App no 16756/90 (ECtHR, 23 February 1994).
21 *Kafkaris* (n 19) para 98.
22 *Vinter* (n 17), para 110.
23 *Iorgov v Bulgaria (no 2)* App no 36295/02 (ECtHR, 2 September 2010) para 49.
24 *Kafkaris* (n 19) Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens, para 2.
25 ibid.
26 *Kafkaris* (n 19) para 99.
to the existence of a review mechanism. Accordingly, the presence of a provision under national law that allows the judge to at least take into account the possibility of an early release is to be considered a crucial factor when the compatibility of a life sentence to the Convention is assessed.\textsuperscript{27} In this regard, it is interesting to note how the Court in \textit{Kafkaris} affirmed that the existence of such a provision should be only considered as a crucial factor that has to be taken into account, rather than decisive criteria for assessing whether there has been a violation of Article 3.\textsuperscript{28}

\subsection*{2.1.2. The legitimate penological grounds}

All the above mentioned is not to say that a sentence that must be served in full is \textit{per se} contrary to the scope of Article 3.\textsuperscript{29} In fact, a prisoner might be obliged to serve the full sentence if, after having been considered for (early) release, or she is refused ‘on the ground that he or she continued to pose a danger to society’.\textsuperscript{30} In this regard, the Court recalled that States have the obligation to take measures for the protection of society from violent crimes.\textsuperscript{31} For this purpose, it might be necessary to impose an indeterminate (life) sentence that entails a continued detention of the dangerous prisoner.\textsuperscript{32} Hence, it is enough that the sentence is \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} reducible, meaning that national law must provide for a review mechanism aimed at finding whether the changes and the progress in the life of the prisoner are so significant, that detention can no longer be justified on ‘legitimate penological grounds’.\textsuperscript{33} A detention can be considered to be justified on legitimate penological grounds when its primary aim(s) is/are either

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Francesco Viganò, ‘Ergastolo senza speranza di liberazione condizionale e art. 3 CEDU: (poche) luci e (molte) ombre in due recenti sentenze della Corte di Strasburgo’ (2012) Diritto Penale Contemporaneo 3.
\item \textsuperscript{29} \textit{Kafkaris} (n 19) para 98; \textit{Vinter} (n 17), para 108.
\item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{Vinter} (n 17), para 108.
\item \textsuperscript{31} \textit{Osman v the United Kingdom} App no 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998) para 115.
\item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Dickson v the United Kingdom} App no 44362/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2007) para 75; \textit{Vinter} (n 17), para 108; \textit{T v the United Kingdom} App no 24724/94 (ECtHR, 16 December 1999) para 97; \textit{V v the United Kingdom} App no 24888/94 (ECtHR, 16 December 1999) para 98.
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Vinter} (n 17), para 119.
\end{itemize}
punishment, deterrence, public protection, or rehabilitation.34 Should at least one of these ‘penological grounds’ not be present at the time when a life sentence is imposed, a prisoner cannot be lawfully and legitimately detained.35 Of course, as the Court noted in Vinter, such penological grounds, on which the detention must be justified, may change throughout the course of the sentence. Thus, for this reason, it is crucial to carry out ‘the review of the justification for continued detention at an appropriate point in the sentence that these factors or shifts can be properly evaluated’.36

2.1.3 The role of rehabilitation and the right to hope

The Court noted that within the European penal policy, much more emphasis has been placed on rehabilitation and reintegration. These two facts have both become two crucial penological grounds that Contracting States have to take into consideration while implementing their penal policies.37 On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the Convention itself does not guarantee per se a right to rehabilitation of the prisoners. Hence, Article 3 cannot be interpreted as imposing an absolute duty for prison authority to engage prisoners in rehabilitative and social reintegrative programs and activities.38 However, the Court stressed that Article 3 has to be interpreted as requiring those authorities to give life sentence prisoners not only ‘a chance, however remote, to someday regain their freedom, but also a real opportunity to rehabilitate themselves’, in order to make that chance ‘genuine and tangible’.39 Indeed, depriving a whole-life prisoner of his or her freedom, without giving him or her any possibility of rehabilitation nor the ‘chance to regain that freedom at some future date’ would be incompatible with human dignity and would entail a degrading treatment contrary to the scope of the Convention. In other words, a prisoner convicted of life term

34 Vinter (n 17), para 111.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 Dickson (n 32) para 75; See also Harakchiev and Tolumov v Bulgaria App no 15018/11, 61199/12 (ECtHR, 8 July 2014) para 243-246; Khoroshenko v Russia App no 41418/04 (ECtHR, 30 June 2015) para 121.
38 Harakchiev and Tolumov (37) para 264.
39 ibid.
imprisonment must be guaranteed the so-called ‘right to hope’, namely the right ‘to know, at the outset of his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and under what conditions’. In fact, the knowledge of the conditions for release allows prisoners to properly work on the pathway toward rehabilitation and social reintegration. The Court stressed the importance of the rehabilitative principle also in Dickson where it clearly showed support for the principle of progression, according to which the more advanced the sentencing stage, more room should be given to rehabilitation, and less to retribution.

Thus, it is possible to infer that the concepts of ‘right to hope’, rehabilitation, and social reintegration are interrelated as each of them strives for the protection of the human dignity of whole-life prisoners. Precisely, what links human dignity to the right to hope is the concept of the right to personal development that must be ensured for the convicted prisoner. In light of what has been said so far, it can be concluded that aiming at the rehabilitation of the prisoner without giving him the right to hope or provide of the possibility of a review without a path toward rehabilitation, would be irrational and contrary to the principles enshrined in the Convention.

2.1.4. The review of the sentence: general conditions

It has to be reminded that is not the Court’s task to establish the form and timing in which the review should take place, as this is left to the discretion of Contracting States.

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40 Vinter (n 17), para 122: ‘(…) who commit the most abhorrent and egregious of acts and who inflict untold suffering upon others, nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to change. Long and deserved though their prison sentences may be, they retain the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs which they have committed. They ought not to be deprived entirely of such hope. To deny them the experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect of their humanity and, to do that, would be degrading’. (Concurring opinion of Judge Power-Forde).

41 ibid para 122.

42 Gustavo Minervini, ‘Viola v Italy: A First Step Towards the End of Life Imprisonment in Italy’ (2020) 29 The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 217, 244.

43 Dickson (n 32) para 28.

44 Smit and Appleton (n 10) 298.

45 Minervini (n 42) 225.

46 Vinter (n 17), para 120.
Contrarily, the Court’s main task is to make sure that domestic law of Contracting States provides for the possibility of such review and sanction the States where whole life sentences do not meet the standards of Article 3 of the Convention, namely where such review mechanisms are absent.\textsuperscript{47} Should domestic law not provide any mechanism or possibility of reviewing a whole life sentence, Article 3 is to be considered violated from the moment of the imposition of such a sentence.\textsuperscript{48} States are not only required to provide a review mechanism under their national law, but they must make clear under what conditions a whole-life prisoner might be taken into account for release.\textsuperscript{49} Indeed, where an ‘objective, pre-established criteria of which the prisoner [have] precise cognizance at the time of imposition of the life sentence’ is lacking, a violation of Article 3 for the inadequacy of a sentence review mechanism would occur.\textsuperscript{50}

In sum, the review mechanism, in order to be compliant with Article 3 ECHR must follow the following principles, as pointed out by Judge Pinto Albuquerque in his partly dissenting opinion in the case of Murray v. the Netherlands:\textsuperscript{51}

1) The principle of legality (“rules having a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty,” “conditions laid down in domestic legislation”);
2) The principle of the assessment of penological grounds for continued incarceration, on the basis of “objective, pre-established criteria,” which include resocialization (special prevention), deterrence (general prevention), and retribution;
3) The principle of assessment within a pre-established time frame and, in the case of life prisoners, “not later than 25 years after the imposition of the sentence and thereafter a periodic review”;
4) The principle of fair procedural guarantees, which include at least the obligation to give reasons for decisions not to release or to recall a prisoner;
5) The principle of judicial review.

\textsuperscript{47} ibid, para 121.
\textsuperscript{48} ibid, para 122.
\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Trabelsi v Belgium App no 140/10 (ECtHR, 4 September 2014) para 137.
\textsuperscript{51} Partly dissenting opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Murray v the Netherlands, App no 10511/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016) 52.
2.1.5. The presidential pardon

At this point, the following question should be addressed: is the sole possibility under the national law of adjustment of a life sentence through presidential pardon or clemency sufficient for the purpose of Article 3 ECHR? In this regard, the Court found no violation of the Convention when such possibility is given only in the form of pardon/commutation of the President,\(^52\) or it is subject only to the discretion of the Head of State.\(^53\) However, where the mere provision of presidential clemency under domestic law is completely detached from any assessment concerning the eligibility for release on parole, such provision would be in contrast with the Convention. In fact, it would not allow prisoners to know under what conditions they might be considered for release.\(^54\) And this is even more evident where the provisions concerning presidential clemency are extremely vague,\(^55\) or where there is no obligation for the President to motivate the decisions on clemency.\(^56\)

2.1.6. The timing of the review: the twenty-five years criteria

Until 2011, the ECtHR’s case law on life imprisonment had primarily concerned the nature of such punishment. Only after 2011, had the Court started to also examine issues regarding the duration of the imprisonment. Be as it may, throughout the course of the years, the Court has always highlighted that it is not the Court’s task to establish neither the appropriate length of detention nor the timing in which the review should take place.\(^57\) Nevertheless, the Court, in the last fifteen years, tried to interpret the cases at issue in light of the comparative and international law

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\(^52\) Iorgov (n 23) para 51-60.
\(^53\) Kafkaris (n 19) para 103.
\(^54\) László Magyar v Hungary App no 73593/10 (ECtHR, 20 May 2014), para 58.
\(^55\) Trabelsi (n 50) para 133-138. For instance, in the case of Petukhov, domestic law provided that presidential clemency could have been granted in ‘exceptional and extraordinary circumstances’, without specifying what those terms meant (Petukhov v Ukraine (no 2) App no 41216/13 ECtHR, 12 March 2019 para 173).
\(^56\) Murray v the Netherlands (n 51) para 100.
\(^57\) See, ex multis, T v the United Kingdom (n 32) para 117; V v the United Kingdom (n 32) para 118; Vinter (n 18), para 105.
practice of the Contracting States. Very peculiar, and different from the *post-Vinter* scenario, is the case of *Törköly* where the Court found that a prisoner who would become eligible for conditional release after forty years of imprisonment constituted ‘a distant but a real possibility’. 58 Contrarily, in 2016 and in 2021, respectively in the case of *T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary*59 and in *Sandor Varga and others v. Hungary*,60 the Court found that the possibility of parole after forty years of imprisonment is incompatible with the meaning of Article 3 ECHR.

Indeed, it is clear that from *Vinter* onwards, the Court has been sufficiently consistent in remarking the comparative and international support for a review mechanism capable of being activated no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of a life sentence, ‘with periodic review thereafter’.61 In support of this argument, the Court in *Vinter* cited, *ex multis*, the provision under the International Criminal Court’s Statutes, which is considered to set international standards, where Article 110(3) provides that the review of a sentence shall not be conducted before the prisoner convicted to life imprisonment has served at least twenty-five years of the sentence. Interestingly, this European and international trend, namely the (potential) release after having served twenty-five years of the sentence, according to Van Zyl Smit and Appleton, certifies the European and International attention to the right of the prisoner to resocialization.62

For instance, the Court found no violation of Article 3 in the case of *Čačko* where the domestic law at issue provided for the possibility for a whole-life prisoner to be conditionally released after having served twenty-five years of his term.63 Analogously, in *Bodein* the Court considered the applicant’s sentence to be in compliance with the criteria established in *Vinter*, as he was eligible to apply for release twenty-six years after

58 *Törköly v Hungary (dec)* App no 4413/06 (ECtHR) p 5.
60 *Sandor Varga and others v Hungary* App no 39734/15, 35530/16 and 26804/18 (ECtHR, 17 June 2021).
61 *Vinter* (n 17) para 120; *Murray* (n 51) para 99; *Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom* App no 57592/08 (ECtHR, January 17 2017) para 69.
62 Smit and Appleton (n 10) 216.
63 *Čačko v Slovakia* App no 49905/08 (ECtHR, 22 July 2014) para 77.
the imposition of the life sentence, even though under domestic law the review was possible after 30 years’ incarceration, well beyond the abovementioned international supported standards. In this regard, the Court clarified that the timing for the review mechanism should be calculated from the imposition of the sentence and not from the very first incarceration, which it might take place before any judgment is rendered as a security measure. Hence, as a general principle, it can be said that a period of about twenty-five years or less, which run from the moment in which the life sentence is imposed, is sufficient to consider a life sentence as reducible.64

2.2. The case of Viola v. Italy

On June 2019 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the case of Viola v. Italy rendered a decision concerning the compatibility of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison Administration Act L. 354/1975 (hereinafter P.A.) with Article 3 ECHR. The case dealt with the reducibility of a life sentence imposed on a person who was found guilty of crimes committed within the context of a mafia criminal organization. This type of life sentence (also commonly referred to as ergastolo ostativo), before the reform enacted in November 2022 provided, as described in Chapter 1, that a prisoner convicted for particularly serious offences, such as Mafia offences or terrorism, could not be eligible for release on parole or other beneficial treatments, such as the possibility to work outside the prison and alternative measures to detention, unless he did cooperate with law enforcement, except for the hypothesis that such collaboration was considered to be ‘impossible’ or ‘irrelevant’. The Grand Chamber ultimately found that this type of life imprisonment was in violation of Article 3 ECHR, as the applicant’s sentence was de facto irreducible.

2.2.1. The case

The judicial development of this case is particularly complex. In the following lines, we will try to point out the relevant facts that led the applicant to file an appeal to the ECtHR. In the first place, it has to be highlighted that the applicant was convicted

64 Murray (n 51) para 99; Vella v Malta (déc) App no 14612/19 (ECtHR, 27 February 2018) para 19.
several times by different courts. The first trial was held between 1990 and 1992 at the end of which the Court of Assize of Appeal of Reggio Calabria in 1999 convicted Mr. Viola to twelve years of imprisonment. In the second trial, also known as the ‘Taurus Trial’, he was convicted to life imprisonment again by the Court of Assize of Appeal of Reggio Calabria in 2002. In both trials, the applicant was convicted for having committed several crimes, including the crime ex Article 416-bis Italian Criminal Code (associazione di stampo mafioso).65 Then, he was subject to the special detention regime 41-bis O.P. between 2000 and 2006, until the Tribunale di Sorveglianza revoked such measure in 2006. Subsequently, later in the years, he filed two requests for the obtainment of a temporary release (permesso premio), which were both rejected respectively in 2011 and in 2015. Simultaneously, in 2015, Mr. Viola presented also a request for release on parole (liberazione condizionale) ex Article 176 c.p. to the Tribunale di Sorveglianza of L’Aquila. As grounds, he claimed the good behavior taken in prison, and the absence of links with criminal organizations, alleging also the unconstitutionality of Article 4-bis O.P. for contrasting both with Article 27(3) of the Italian Constitution and with Article 3 ECHR. His request was first rejected on May 2015 on the basis that because of Article 4-bis O.P. the applicant could not be considered to be eligible for release on parole, as the collaboration with judicial authorities, which in that circumstance was not neither ‘impossible’ nor ‘irrelevant’, was lacking. Against this decision, Mr. Viola filed an appeal to the Italian Court of Cassation in which he claimed the unconstitutionality of the provision at hand, in the extent to which it did provide a legal mechanism that rendered the ‘non-collaborative’ prisoner unable to obtain the release on parole. However, the Court of Cassation rejected his appeal with the judgment N. 1153/16, in which it pointed out the absolute character of the

65 This offence does not have a proper translation since only the Italian system of criminal justice does have a specific provision within the criminal code (Art. 416-bis) specifically aimed at contrasting Mafia Associations and crimes linked to it. A ‘forced’ translation of associazione di stampo mafioso could be ‘Mafia-type criminal association/organization’: ‘The association is a Mafia-type criminal association when the participants take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting condition of submission and silence to commit offences, to manage or control, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorizations, public contracts and services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for any other persons, or with the aim of stopping or making it difficult to exercise the free right to vote, or to organize votes for themselves or others during public elections’.
presumption of social dangerousness in case of absence of collaboration and the total discretion of the legislator to determine the requirements that have to be met for the obtainment of the release on parole.\textsuperscript{66} Hence, the applicant ultimately started the proceedings before the ECtHR, complaining about the violation of Article 3 ECHR, as the life sentence it was imposed on him was \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure} irreducible.

\textbf{2.2.2. The decision of the Court}

The Court, in deciding over the issue, in the first place, took into account both the national legislation and the relevant case law of the Court of Cassation and of the Corte Costituzionale. In analyzing the jurisprudence of these two Courts, not only did the ECtHR find that the principles of rehabilitation and resocialization of the punishment were two core principles in the Italian system of criminal justice,\textsuperscript{67} but also that the \textit{ergastolo ostativo} was found to be compatible with the Italian Constitution.\textsuperscript{68}

Subsequently, after having recalled principles on life imprisonment elaborated by the ECtHR in \textit{Vinter}, \textit{Kafkaris}, \textit{Murray}, and \textit{Hutchison}, the Court undertook the analysis of the case at hand. In order to assess whether the sentence of Mr. Viola was \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} reducible, the Court focused its attention, particularly on the relationship collaboration-eligibility for obtaining benefits. In other words, the Court’s aim was to find to what extent the subordination of the eligibility for the obtainment of parole or temporary releases to the collaboration with judicial authorities was in compliance with Article 3 ECHR.

The Court started by pinpointing that the access to release on parole and to the other benefits was not entirely precluded by the system in force back then. Rather it was subject to the collaboration of the prisoner with judicial authorities.\textsuperscript{69} Then, the Court acknowledged the complexity and gravity of the mafia phenomenon, which is characterized by an ongoing adherence to the criminal belief of the members, which led the Italian legislator to prioritize general prevention and public safety. In other words,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Viola} (n 3) para 28.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} See e.g. Corte Cost., 4 February 1966, n.12; Corte Cost., 4 July 1990, n. 313.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} See, ex multis, Corte Cost., 8 June 1993, n. 306.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Viola} (n 3) para 101.
\end{itemize}
the Court was fully aware that Article 4-bis O.P. did constitute a precious resource within the war against mafia. Nevertheless, the Court questioned the legitimacy of *ergastolo ostativo* insofar as it subordinated the release on parole and other beneficial treatments to the collaboration of the prisoner. If on the one hand, the system then in force gave the prisoner the freedom of choice as to whether to collaborate or not, the Court 1) doubted the freedom of that choice and 2) highly questioned the equivalence: absence of collaboration = social dangerousness.70 With regard to the first issue, the Court noted that the choice to not collaborate may depend on the fear of putting the lives of the prisoner and of his relatives in serious danger. Hence, a lack of cooperation, according to the Court, cannot always be considered a result of a free choice and something from which it is possible to unquestionably infer the ongoing support to the criminal organization.71 With regard to the second issue, the Court argued that the derivation of an absolute presumption of social dangerousness from a lack of collaboration of the prisoner does not allow to take into account other circumstances relevant for assessing the progress made towards rehabilitation.72 In fact, as argued among scholars, such equivalence “freezes” the absolute presumption of social dangerousness at the time of the commission of the offence,73 and did not reflect the progress made by the prisoner.74 In other words, for the prisoner convicted to *ergastolo ostativo*, it was as if the time stopped at the moment of the reading of the sentence at the end of the trial. Whereas the Court reasonably observed that the personality of a convicted prisoner evolves during the period of detention, being that the ultimate scope of the detention, in accordance with the rehabilitation principle.75 Hence, the Court declared the violation of Article 3

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71 Viola (n 3) para 118. In this regard, see also Marina Silvia Mori, ‘Prime osservazioni sulla sentenza Marcello Viola c. Italia (n. 2) in materia di ergastolo ostativo’ (2019) 6 Giurisprudenza penale 7.

72 Viola (n 3) para 121.


74 Mori (n 71) 7.

75 Viola (n 4) para 125.
ECHR on the basis that the abovementioned absolute presumption provided by Article 4-bis O.P. *de facto* prevented the judge from correctly assessing: 1) the request for the release on parole; and 2) whether, during the course of the sentence, the applicant had made substantial progress toward rehabilitation so that detention could not have been justified on legitimate penological grounds. Further, as to the claim of the Government pursuant to which the applicant in any event could have received presidential clemency or requested the release on parole for medical reasons, the Court, by recalling its jurisprudence on the matter, clearly said that a prisoner convicted to life imprisonment, such as the applicant, cannot be said to have a *prospect of release*, just for the fact he can potentially rely on clemency or on grounds of health or age.\(^76\)

3. **The new Article 4-bis O.P.**

According to the new provisions, the lack of collaboration with judicial authorities and law enforcement does not automatically preclude access to prison benefits *ex Article 4-bis (1) O.P.*. The previous system was reformed in light of the judgments rendered by the ECtHR\(^77\) and the Italian Constitutional Court.\(^78\) The two courts highly condemned the absolute character of the presumption of the dangerousness of the non-collaborative prisoner.\(^79\)

Indeed, the new regime, allows also non-collaborative prisoners to obtain the

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\(^{76}\) ibid para 133. See also, *Kafkaris* (n 19) para 127; *Öcalan v Turkey (no 2)*, App no 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06, 10464/07 (ECtHR, 18 March 2014) para 203; *László Magyar* (n 54) para 57-58.

\(^{77}\) *Viola* (n 3).

\(^{78}\) Corte Cost., 23 October 2019, judgment n. 253; Corte Cost., 15 April 2021, judgment n. 97.

\(^{79}\) In the case of *Viola* (n 3), the ECtHR ruled that the life sentence (*ergastolo ostativo*) imposed on the applicant restricted both his prospects of release and the possibility of the review. Indeed, the Court found that applicant’s sentence was de facto irreducible, as the abovementioned absolute presumption provided by Article 4-bis O.P. prevented the judge correctly assess: 1) the request for the release on parole; and 2) whether, during the course of the sentence, the applicant had made substantial progress toward rehabilitation so that a detention could not have been justified on legitimate penological grounds. With regard to the judgment 97/2021 of the Italian Constitutional Court, the Court concluded that absolute presumption of social dangerousness inferred from the lack of collaboration – which prevent the prisoner to be considered eligible for parole or other benefits – was constitutionally illegitimate and unreasonable as was based on a generalization that can be, instead, contradicted from ordinary facts (para. 6-7).
aforementioned prison benefits, under certain conditions. The new provision requires, by inverting the onus of proof, the allegation by the prisoner of additional facts and to the evaluation of additional circumstance that does not strictly concern the rehabilitation of the prisoners and the assessment of his social dangerousness. Indeed, according to the new formulation of Article 4-bis(1-bis), the prisoner convicted to ergastolo ostativo shall be considered eligible for prison benefits, also in absence of an ‘effective collaboration’ ex Article 58-ter O.P., under certain strict conditions. In brief, the prisoner is required to prove: 1) the absence of any links with the ‘criminal context in which the crime was committed’, and 2) the danger of the restoration of such link. In order to prove his present and future detachment from the criminal context, the prisoner shall also prove additional circumstances. In the first place, he shall prove either the fulfillment of any civil obligations and pecuniary reparation obligations resulting from the conviction, or the impossibility of such reparation. In the second place, the prisoner shall pinpoint ‘specific, different and additional circumstances’ other than the prison behavior, the participation in the rehabilitation process, and the mere declaration of detachment from the criminal context. In order to assess whether the detachment of the prisoner from any possible criminal context took place, the judge (magistrato di sorveglianza) will take into account also: 1) the personal circumstances; 2) the alleged reasons for the non-collaboration with the justice authorities, and 3) any other available information, including whether any form of reparation or restoration took place.

Indeed, the next sections will be aimed at analyzing in detail the current provision. In particular, section 3 will examine the requirement of damage compensation, whereas section 4 will reason upon the ‘additional, specific and different elements’.

### 3.1. The fulfillment of civil obligations and pecuniary damage caused by the crime or the proof of the impossibility to do so.

In the first place, in order to overcome the abovementioned presumption of social dangerousness, the prisoner is now asked to prove the fulfillment of civil obligations and pecuniary reparation obligations resulting from the conviction (damage compensation). Where this would result impossible, the prisoner must prove the (absolute) impossibility of this reparation. However, to which extent is it legitimate to subordinate the access of these benefits to the fulfillment of pecuniary and civil
obligations by the prisoner? The ECtHR in *Matiošaitis and Others v Lithuania*\(^{80}\) partially tried to give an answer to this question. The underlying case concerned the granting of the presidential pardon. For this purpose, according to the national legislation, judicial authorities were required to take into account whether the compensation for pecuniary damage caused by the crime had been paid. Interestingly, the Court found that such criteria was legitimate, as it allowed the President to assess whether a life prisoner’s continued imprisonment was justified on legitimate penological grounds.\(^{81}\)

Under the Italian Criminal Code, the release on parole (*liberazione condizionale*) and presidential clemency (*grazia*) are causes of extinction of the sentence (*cause di estinzione della pena*). As such, they are subject to the fulfillment of civil obligations arising out of the judgment. Instead, the temporary releases, the work outside the prison, and the alternative measures to detention cannot be classified as causes of extinction of the sentence: they are prison benefits, more or less temporary, or different ways of serving a sentence. On one hand, it can be said that it might be reasonable to require the fulfillment of the aforementioned obligations as a precondition for granting measures of extinction of the sentence (such as the release on parole). In fact, these measures entail a complete assessment of whether a life prisoner’s continued imprisonment is justified on legitimate penological grounds. On the other hand, it can be argued that requiring damage compensation and the fulfillment of civil obligations for the prison benefits other than the release on parole, seems disproportionate. In fact, those measures do not imply a full assessment of the rehabilitation of the prisoner. Only the release on parole or presidential clemency can be said to imply such an assessment. Instead, these measures are supposed to further the process of rehabilitation and social reintegration of the prisoner. Even a single temporary release, such as a day out of prison for work reasons, or a single day of social service probation can have extremely beneficial effects on the prisoner. Thus, it can be concluded that requiring the fulfillment of civil obligations and compensation for damages even to access prison benefits other than

\(^{80}\) *Matiošaitis and Others v Lithuania*, App no 22662/13, 51059/13, 58823/13, 59692/13, 60115/13, 69425/13 (ECtHR, 23 May 2017).

\(^{81}\) ibid para 168. Examples of ‘legitimate penological grounds’ are e.g. punishment, deterrence, protection of the public and rehabilitation (*Vinter* (n 17), para 14).
conditional release, because they make the access to these measures more difficult, the rehabilitation process may be obstructed a priori, where the prisoner should not be able to fulfill these obligations.

At this point, another question arises: to what extent can the lack of fulfillment of pecuniary and civil obligation be classified as an element from which to infer the social dangerousness of a prisoner? It can be argued that the fulfillment of the civil obligations and the compensation for pecuniary damages caused by the crime are not directly related to the concrete assessment of social dangerousness, namely the existence of any links between the prisoner and organized crime. In fact, a prisoner may fulfill the aforementioned obligations while nevertheless continuing to adhere to the criminal belief of their original criminal organizations and maintain a stable relationship with them. Hence, it can be concluded that from the fulfillment of civil and pecuniary obligations, it is impossible to ascertain, even only partially, whether a prisoner is still linked to a criminal organization. Accordingly, the fulfillment of civil and pecuniary obligations must not be intended as one of the factor from which to infer the lack of social dangerousness. Similarly, the lack of fulfillment of these obligations cannot be intended as a symptom of social dangerousness.

Ultimately, one could argue that the fulfillment of these obligations, in reality, is not a proper condition for the grant of the aforementioned prison benefits. In fact, according to the new provision, the prisoner may nevertheless be considered eligible for the benefits ex Article 4-bis (1) O.P. where the fulfillments of these obligations result to be impossible. However, the law also requires that in this case, the prisoner must prove the ‘absolute impossibility’ of such fulfillment. Further, not only is the new legislation silent on how the prisoner is supposed to prove such impossibility, but also it does not give any information whatsoever regarding what should be classified as an ‘absolute’ impossibility.

Conclusively, taking into consideration what has been said so far, the threshold for accessing these benefits seems to be very high under the new legislative framework. And the threshold seems to be even higher in the remaining part of the provision. In fact, the fulfillment of civil obligations and the payment of pecuniary damages, or alternatively the proof of the absolute impossibility of that, is not the only condition that has to be met to access the abovementioned prison benefits.
3.2. The ‘additional, specific and different elements’: the inversion of the onus of proof

Under the new provision it is also required, through an inversion of the onus of proof, the attachment by the prisoner of ‘additional, specific and different elements’. According to the new law, these elements must be additional and different from the mere prison behavior, the mere participation in the rehabilitation process, and the mere declaration of detachment from the criminal organization. From these ‘additional and different elements’ judicial authorities should be able to infer 1) the absence of any links with the ‘context in which the crime was committed’, and 2) the danger of the restoration of such links.

The new formulation of Article 4-bis(1-bis) O.P., with regard to this inversion of the onus of proof, has been partially ‘suggested’ by the Italian Constitutional Court. In fact, the Court in 2019 and 2021 claimed that, in absence of collaboration, the presumption of social dangerousness can be overcome by the acquisition of ‘additional, congruous and specific elements’. Indeed, even in the Court’s opinion, the mere participation in the rehabilitation program or the mere declaration of detachment from criminal organizations should not be sufficient to ascertain the present and future detachment of the prisoner from the criminal context.\(^{82}\) With regard to the access of temporary release, the Court observed that these elements could be, for instance, the social context that prisoner would be allowed to access, albeit temporarily and episodically, as well as other information acquired by law enforcement.

Passing to the analysis of the first part of the provision, in the first place it should be pointed out that no clear definition of ‘additional elements’ is given, nor any criteria whatsoever useful to identify those elements. In the second place, it should be noted that the norm is unclear also as to whether these additional elements must be acquired regardless of the assessment of 1) the rehabilitation of the prisoner, 2) his declaration of the detachment of the criminal context, and 3) the prison behavior. In fact, the norm only mentions that these elements should be ‘additional’ and ‘different’ from such assessment. As regards to the ratio legis, it can be said that it was not the legislator’s

\(^{82}\) Corte Cost., 23 October 2019, judgment n. 253; Corte Cost., 15 April 2021, judgment n. 97.
intention to completely detach the evaluation of the rehabilitation process from the assessment of the social dangerousness of the prisoner. Rather it can be assumed that the intention of the legislator was to require the evaluation of the progresses toward rehabilitation made by the prisoner together with the assessment of additional circumstances, also in light of personal circumstances, of the alleged reasons of non-collaboration, of the “critical rethinking” (revisione critica) of the criminal conduct, and in light of any other available information. Hence, the mere participation in rehabilitation programs, the mere declaration of detachment from the criminal context, and the mere prison behavior are, indeed, not sufficient for the granting of the aforementioned prison benefits. However, Article 3 ECHR

must be interpreted as requiring […] domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.

But how can the progresses toward rehabilitation of a prisoner be assessed, for the purpose of a future release, if his conduct and his participation in the rehabilitation programs are not even sufficient for the granting of benefits that are supposed to, instead, enhance the rehabilitation process itself?

At this point, a clarification needs to be made. According to the Court of Cassation,83 along the same lines as the Constitutional Court,84 Article 4-bis (1-bis) O.P. would not set *per se* an inversion of the onus of proof at the expense of the prisoner. In this regard, the Court of Cassation argued that there would be a difference between the term ‘allegation’ and ‘proof’: by requiring just the ‘attachment’ (allegazione) of ‘additional, specific and different elements’, the new norm would not ask the prisoner to actually ‘prove’ (dimostrazione) these elements. In the Court’s opinion, only in the event that any elements from which to infer the existence of ongoing links with criminal organization come to light, the prisoner would be asked to provide contrary evidence (elementi di prova contraria), by the proof, and not the mere attachment, of these

83 Cass., 8 March 2023, sez. I Penale, para. 9, Requisitoria per Udienza in Camera di Consiglio.

84 Corte Cost. 10 November 2022, Judgment n. 227.
elements. Be as it may, the Court’s reasoning is not convincing for two sets of reasons.

In the first place, nowhere does the new formulation of Article 4-bis(1) expressly provide that the prisoner would be required to ‘prove’ rather than ‘attach’ the aforementioned additional elements in the event that evidence of his social dangerousness would arise. The norm only refers to the attachment of these additional elements as a *conditio sine qua non* for the access to the prison benefits *ex* Article 4-bis O.P., not even taking into consideration the hypothesis of emersion of evidence from which to infer the existence of links between the prisoner and the criminal organization. Nevertheless, even if the legislator’s intention was to require the prisoner to ‘prove’, and not simply to ‘attach’, additional elements only when some indication of ties with organized crime would come up, the prisoner would be in any event required to provide contrary evidence ‘within a reasonable period of time’. Indeed, this would result, in any event, in an inversion of the onus of proof.\(^8^5\) In the second place, it is unreasonable to think that there is a difference, on a practical level, between *attachment* and *proof*. In fact, it is by attaching a given circumstance that such circumstance or element is proved. In other words, it is impossible to imagine the attachment of ‘additional, specific and different elements’, without this attachment resulting in actual proof of those elements.

In light of all abovementioned, it is clear that what is asked to prisoners is the fulfillment and the proof of additional obligations and requirements completely detached: 1) from the assessment of the exclusion of any links with criminal organizations; 2) the assessment of the danger of the restoration of such links; 3) the assessment of the progress of the prisoner toward rehabilitation.\(^8^6\) Indeed, because the benefits listed in Article 4-bis §1 O.P. it can be argued to constitute the very first step toward rehabilitation, by subordinating the access to these measures to such unreasonable\(^8^7\) high burden

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86 See also Comunicato Camere Penali, ‘Rinvio della riforma Cartabia e stretta sulle ostatività: la presa di posizione dell’Unione’, 31st of October 2022: ‘La riscrittura del comma 1 bis dell’articolo 4bis (…) inserisce un percorso talmente contorto e ricco di requisiti aggiuntivi, tautologici o assolutamente disancorati rispetto alla congrua valutazione per la esclusione di collegamenti attuali con la criminalità organizzata e dal pericolo di concreto ripristino (…)’.

of proof, the rehabilitation process might be seriously hindered.

It is true that the Convention does not guarantee a right to rehabilitation *per se*. Nevertheless, the ECtHR highlighted that the support and commitment to the rehabilitative aim of punishment among Contracting States, especially Italy, is undeniable. In light of such wide support for rehabilitation, according to the Court, the Convention does, instead, require prison authorities put life prisoners in the conditions to rehabilitate themselves.

In this regard, the Court recalled in *Kaytan v. Turkey* that life sentence prisoners ‘should be given the opportunity to progress towards rehabilitation’. Further, as stressed in *Vinter*’s concurring opinion by judge Power-Forde, even prisoners who commit the most horrendous crimes ‘nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to change’. Hence, they must be guaranteed the so-called right to hope, namely the right to ‘hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs which they have committed’.

In the case at issue, it is true that on one hand, under the new legislation, prisoners are *de jure* provided with an opportunity for rehabilitation. On the other hand, the access to the aforementioned measures, which constitutes the essence of the rehabilitation process, can be said to be *de facto* rendered impossible by a *probatio diabolica*, namely the disproportionate evidentiary regime featured by an unreasonable inversion of the onus of proof at the expenses of the prisoner. Further, with regard to the release on parole, such *probatio diabolica* also deprives the prisoners of any concrete...
prospect of release. Hence, it can be concluded that because prisoners are not given a ‘real opportunity’ to rehabilitate themselves nor a ‘right to hope’, the new formulation of Article 4-bis(1-bis) O.P., as reformed by Law 199/2022, should be considered as entailing a degrading treatment contrary to principles enshrined in Article 3 ECHR.

3.3. The timing of the review

Under Article 2(1)(b) of Law 199/2022 the prisoner convicted to *ergastolo ostativo* under Article 4-bis (1) O.P. can be considered eligible for parole (*liberazione condizionale*) only after having served at least thirty years of their sentence, without prejudice to the conditions required by the same Article 4-bis for the granting of the aforementioned prison benefits.

From a close reading of the norms, one could immediately notice that there is a slight but important departure from the original provision. In fact, pursuant to the old regime, the prisoner convicted to *ergastolo ostativo* was considered eligible for parole after having served twenty-six years of his sentence. Hence, it is self-evident that the period after which the prisoner can request a review of his sentence has been reformed *in peius*. Indeed, at this point, it should be addressed the question of whether the timing of the new review mechanism measures up to the standards of Article 3 of the Convention.

It has been recalled several times by the ECtHR that it is not the Court’s task establish neither the appropriate length of detention nor the timing in which the review should take place. However, it is undeniable the comparative and international support for a review mechanism capable of being activated no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of a life sentence, ‘with periodic review thereafter’. It is true that the ECtHR in *Bodein v. France*, for instance, found no violation of the Convention, even

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92 See, ex multis, *T v the United Kingdom* (n 32) para 117; *V v the United Kingdom* (n 32) para 118; *Vinter* (n 17), para 105.

93 See *Vinter* (n 17), para 120; *Ćačko* (n 63) para 77; *Bodein v France*, App no 40014/10 (ECtHR, 13 February 2015); *Murray* (n 51), para. 99; *Hutchinson* (n 61) para 69. More recently, the Court reiterated that the possibility of parole after forty years of imprisonment is incompatible with the meaning of Article 3 ECHR, *Sandor Varga and others* (n 60); See also *Tp and A.t v Hungary* (n 59).

94 *Bodein* (n 93).
though under domestic law the review was possible after 30 years of incarceration. Nevertheless, in the underlying case, the applicant was fully eligible to apply for release twenty-six years after the imposition of his life sentence. In general, in order for a mechanism review to be compatible with the principles enshrined in Article 3 ECHR, it should entail a period of about twenty-five years or less, that run from the moment in which the life sentence is imposed.95

Turning back to the ergastolo ostativo, the new provision does not specify whether the timing of the review should be calculated from the incarceration or from the imposition of the sentence. The law only provides for the possibility to request release on parole after having served thirty years of the sentence, or, in case of temporary punishment, at least two thirds of it. Although very unlikely, if not impossible, considering the nature of the offenses punished ex Article 4-bis, it cannot be excluded that a prisoner convicted to ergastolo ostativo may be de facto considered eligible for parole (liberazione condizionale) well before the 30th year, as it happened in the case of Bodein. Nevertheless, it is evident that, in case where a prisoner is required to serve thirty years of his sentence before being considered eligible for parole, the review mechanism would fall outside the scope of the principles established in the Convention.96 In fact, through the infliction of an aggravating treatment on prisoners who lawfully decide to not collaborate with judicial authorities,97 such mechanism would render the sentence de jure irreducible, depriving the prisoner of any prospect of release.

4. **Recommendations**

Undoubtedly, Article 4-bis O.P. has always been, and will continue to be, one of the most effective tools in the fight against the mafia; indeed, it is not conceivable to definitely set aside such an instrument. However, the new system of ergastolo ostativo needs to be partially reformed along the lines of what has been shown so far, bearing in

95 *Murray* (n 51), para 99; *Vella* (n 64), para 19.
96 ibid.; *Vella* (n 64) para 19.
97 *Comunicato Camere Penali* (n 86).
mind that any reform must be carried out in light of the extreme social dangerousness of the mafia phenomenon. For this purpose, in the first place, the legislator should consider setting a different evidentiary regime for non-collaborative prisoners on the basis of the prison benefit requested (section 4.1.). In the second place, it should be (re)introduced a more simplified evidentiary regime for prisoners who did not collaborate because of their limited participation in the offence (section 4.2.). In the third place, more value should be given to the rehabilitation path and to prisoner’s redemption (section 4.3.). Ultimately, the legislator should consider to lower the timing required for the review of the sentence from thirty to twenty-five years (section 4.4.).

4.1. Set a different evidentiary regime for non-collaborative prisoners on the basis of the prison benefit requested

In order to reform the current system in the sense of Article 3 ECHR, in the first place the legislator should differentiate the hypothesis of non-collaborative prisoners seeking a temporary release, an alternative measure to detention or to work outside the prisoner, from non-collaborative prisoners requesting a release on parole (liberazione condizionale). As has been underlined in the previous subsections, the access to these measure should be differentiated, as they imply different assessments and affect sets of interests. On one hand, the release on parole requires a full assessment of ‘whether there are legitimate penological grounds for the continuing incarceration of the prisoner’,\(^{98}\) by taking into account 1) any significant changes in the life of the prisoner and 2) the progress towards rehabilitation made in the course of the sentence.\(^{99}\) On the other hand, the work outside the prison, the temporary releases, and the alternative measures to detention do not require such assessment as they do not imply a potential review of the sentence and a potential full release. Instead, if granted, these measures put the prisoners in the condition to slowly reintegrate themselves into society, but do not give them complete freedom. Hence, it is safe to say that the assessment of the social dangerousness of prisoners seeking a first opportunity to rehabilitate themselves cannot be the same.

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\(^{98}\) Hutchinson (n 61) para 42.

\(^{99}\) Vinter (n 17), para 199.
for prisoners requesting to be released: the threshold should be much lower for the first set of prisoners and higher for the second one. For this purpose, in order to render the current framework compatible with Article 3 ECHR, it could be provided that the prisoners applying for prisoner benefits other than the release on parole may be granted those benefits under a simplified evidentiary regime, with the aim of facilitating his rehabilitation process, rather than making it de facto impossible. For instance, in order to overcome the presumption of social dangerousness in a way that does not entail degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR, it could be provided for those prisoners to jointly take into account: 1) the participation in rehabilitation programs, as well as the prison behavior; 2) the signs of termination of the links with the criminal organizations, such as the declaration of detachment from the criminal context or the “moral redemption” of the prisoner; and 3) the social context in which the prisoner will be temporarily placed (e.g. in case of granting of a temporary release or social work). Whereas, for prisoners seeking for release on parole (liberazione condizionale), it could be provided a tightened evidentiary regime that would require, in addition to the evaluation of progresses toward rehabilitation and the declaration of detachment from the criminal world, also the alleged reasons for not cooperating with judicial authorities, such as the fear of retaliation against one’s self or family.

As above mentioned, the fulfillment of civil and pecuniary obligations caused by the crime appears to be an unreasonable requirement for access to temporary releases, work outside the prison, and to alternative measures to detention. On the other hand, it is safe to say is not disproportionate to take into account the fulfillment of these obligations when granting the release on parole, as long as such fulfillment is not to be intended as a circumstance from which to derive the lack of social dangerousness. Indeed, we believe that the fulfillment of the aforementioned obligations should be only seen as an additional circumstance to take into account, rather than a precondition under which access to the release on parole should be subject.

In any event, regardless of whether a prisoner is asking for the release on parole or for other prison benefits, the burden of proof should not be on him. Rather, it should be on judicial authorities who should deeply investigate the reasons for non-collabora-
tion, as also suggested in the *Progetto della Commissione Francesco Palazzo*, 2013.\(^{100}\)

4.2. (Re)introduce a more simplified evidentiary regime for prisoners who did not collaborate because of their limited participation in the offence

Then – along the lines of what the Italian Constitutional Court held in 1994\(^{101}\) –, it should be re-introduced the possibility to grant the prison benefits *ex* Article 4-bis to the prisoners who were not capable of collaborating because of their limited participation in the criminal offenses and/or their marginal role in the association. For this category of prisoners, it could be introduced a more simplified evidentiary regime – as they can be assumed to be less socially dangerous – that would only require the assessment of exclusion of any link with organized crime through a mere declaration of detachment from criminal organizations.

4.3. Give more value to the rehabilitation path and to prisoner’s redemption

It is true that from the participation in rehabilitation programs, from the prison behavior, and from the mere declaration of detachment from the criminal context it cannot be univocally inferred a lack of social dangerousness. In fact, a criminal may have progressed toward rehabilitation and have declared to not have any link whatsoever with criminal organizations, while having the intention to rejoin the association when he will have the possibility to do so. However, it would be unreasonable and unfair to ignore these two circumstances as they constitute a crucial factor for the assessment of the social dangerousness of the prisoner. That is why it would be reasonable to provide that, for prisoners seeking prison benefits other than the release on parole, these two elements should be evaluated also in light of the social context in which the prisoner will be placed during the temporary release or when serving an alternative measure to detention: this would be crucial for the successful completion of the gradual reintegration process of the prisoner. Similarly, for prisoners seeking a release on parole,

\(^{100}\) Ministero della Giustizia - Commissione per elaborare proposte di interventi in tema di sistema sanzionatorio penale (Commissione istituita con decreto del Ministro della Giustizia del 10 giugno 2013, presieduta dal Prof. Francesco Palazzo). See also, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, ‘Life imprisonment and the European “right to hope”’, (2015) 2 Rivista AIC - Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti 1, 10.

\(^{101}\) Corte Cost., 27 July 1994, judgment n. 357.
in addition to the evaluation of the rehabilitation stage of the prisoner, it might be necessary to inquire also on the alleged reasons for non-collaboration.

4.4. Lower the timing required for the review of the sentence from thirty to twenty-five years

As regards the timing of the review set under the new legislative framework, as it has been shown above, is undoubtedly incompatible with the ECHR, as it renders the entire sentence irreducible. Indeed, the current formulation of Article 4-bis (2), in order to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR, must be reformed in the sense of setting the timing of the review of the sentence, namely when the release on parole may be requested, at twenty-five years, instead of thirty, after the imposition of the sentence. This would make the judgment *de jure* and *de facto* reducible and would allow the prisoner to reintegrate himself into society.

5. Concluding remarks

In light of what has been argued so far, the new legislation raises not few challenges to Article 3 ECHR. On one hand, the amended version of Article 4-bis, by inverting the onus of proof, places an unreasonable high evidentiary burden on the prisoner, making more difficult the access to prison benefits. On the other hand, by raising up to thirty years old the period after which the release on parole is now possible, the new provision renders the review mechanism *de facto* impossible.

In this work we tried to find to which extent the Italian *ergastolo ostativo*, as reformed by Law n. 199/2022 is compatible with Article 3 ECHR. We started with a brief scrutiny of the new legislative framework. Subsequently, we critically assessed each controversial point of the new formulation of Article 4-bis O.P. As first, we pointed out how the broad and vague terminology used in the provision that leave room for mis-interpretations and mis-understandings. Then, we argued how under the new legislation the prisoner is subject to a very harsh regime of onus of proof. Indeed, we pointed out how the prisoner is required to fulfill obligations that are completely detached from the mere assessment of his rehabilitation stage. Hence, we conclude that
such harsh probatory regime, that we have addressed as a being a *probatio diabolica*, makes *de facto* impossible the access to the benefits listed in Article 4-bis O.P. As a consequence, because the rehabilitation process can be seriously hindered, we concluded that the new formulation of Article 4-bis(1-bis) O.P., as reformed by Law 199/2022, should be considered as entailing a degrading treatment contrary to principles enshrined in Article 3 ECHR. Conclusively, we argued that because the new provision allows for a review mechanism (*liberazione condizionale*) after thirty years since the imposition of the sentence, the international support of the ‘twenty-five years criteria’, fully acknowledged by the Court, has been violated. As a result, also on this point, the new provision seems to be in violation of the principles enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention.

As a final remark, we have brought to the attention of the academic community a possible way of reforming the current legislative framework of *ergastolo ostativo*. The reform that we have proposed tries to balance several sets of interests, by taking into account the interests of public safety and public security with the interests of the prisoners to the rehabilitation process. In particular, we argued for an introduction of two different probatory regimes: a stricter one for the access to the release on parole (*liberazione condizionale*), and another one more simplified for the access to measures different from the release on parole. We firmly believe, in fact, that the access to all these benefits should be facilitated, as such measures constitute the essence of the rehabilitation process.